Wills - Testamentary Additions to the Corpus of An Inter Vivos Trust-Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments by Singer, Richard I., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 1 
1958 
Wills - Testamentary Additions to the Corpus of An Inter Vivos 
Trust-Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments 
Richard I. Singer S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard I. Singer S.Ed., Wills - Testamentary Additions to the Corpus of An Inter Vivos Trust-Recent 
Judicial and Legislative Developments, 57 MICH. L. REV. 81 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/5 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1958] COMMENTS 81 
WILLS-TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO THE CORPUS OF AN 
INTER VIVOS TRUST-RECENT JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVEL-
OPMENTS-The shape of the law relating to testamentary additions 
to the corpus of an inter vivos trust was outlined in 1951 by 
Professor George E. Palmer in an article entitled "Testamentary 
Dispositions to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust."1 It is the 
purpose of this comment to consider recent developments in this 
area. A generalized formulation of the problem to be dealt with 
is-may a valid bequest be made to the trustee of an inter vivos 
trust without setting out the terms of the trust in the will? 
Recent Judicial Developments 
A. Where the Trust Is Unamendable and Irrevocable. If the 
inter vivos trust created was neither amendable nor revocable, 
Professor Palmer determined that a valid bequest to its corpus 
could be made in most jurisdictions without repeating the terms 
of the trust in the -will,2 either by resort to the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference3 or the rule "that meaning can be given 
to ... [a] will by reference to facts having 'independent' or 'non-
testamentary' significance."4 There are no current decisions adopt-
ing a contrary view. 
150 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1951). Citations to Professor Palmer's article will hereinafter 
be made in the following form: "Palmer, p. 33." 
2 Palmer, p. 33. 
3Ibid. 
4 Palmer, p. 34. See also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(g) (1955). 
The Restatement of Trusts Second was approved and adopted by the A.L.I. in 1957. 
See 34th Annual Meeting, The American Law Institute, Proceedings, p. 279. 
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B. Where the Trust Is Amendable or Revocable but Is Not 
Altered Subsequent to the Execution of the Will. Where a be-
quest is made to the corpus of an amendable trust without re-
peating its terms in the will, Professor Palmer concluded that: 
"Apart from the opinions of able writers the authority support-
ing ... [this type] of bequest is not impressive."5 The decisions 
invalidating such bequests purport to do so in the name of the 
statute of wills on the theory that a "testator cannot by his will 
prospectively create for himself a power to dispose of this property 
by an instrument not duly executed as a will or codicil.''6 Palmer 
rejected this generalization as a statement of the controlling 
rule of law, and noted a number of distinctions presented by the 
cases which must now be discussed. 
(1) Where the power to amend is restated in the will v. where 
the fact that the trust is amendable appears only in the trust in-
strument. An English case, Matter of I ones,1 invalidated a be-
quest to the trustee of an amendable inter vivos trust, where the 
power to amend was restated in the will. The decision rested 
on the inability of the court to receive evidence which would 
enable it to ascertain whether or not any alterations of the trust 
instrument had been made by the testator subsequent to the exe-
cution of his will. The decision was criticized by Palmer.8 Another 
English case, In re Edwards' Will,9 in which there was no in-
dication in the will that the trust was amendable, recognized that 
a bequest to the corpus of an amendable inter vivos trust could 
be upheld on an incorporation by reference theory.10 These two 
English decisions have been harmonized by In re Schintz Will11 
under the rule that where the power to amend the inter vivos trust 
is referred to in the will itself the bequest is bad; but a power to 
amend the trust which is not referred to in the will does not in-
validate the bequest. A new distinction was drawn in the Schintz 
case, however. The bequest there was made, for the benefit of 
the testator's daughter, Julia, to the trustee of the inter vivos trust 
5 Palmer, p. 45. 
6 Atwood v. 'Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., (1st Cir. 1921) 275 F. 513 at 521. See 
also criticism by Palmer, pp. 38, 42. 
7 [1942] Ch. 328, I All E. R. 642. 
8 Palmer, p. 41. 
9 [1948] Ch. 440. 
10 See Palmer, p. 42. 
11 [1951] Ch. 870. 
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to be held in the same manner as Julia's share in the trust or 
upon such deed or deeds "(if any) which may hereafter be 
executed by me under the power of revocation and declaration 
of new trusts thereby reserved to me or as near thereto as cir-
cumstances will admit."12 The court upheld the bequest even 
though the power to amend the trust was referred to in the will, 
on the theory that the power in the will was not intended to be 
operative, but rather merely descriptive of the terms of the trust. 
The language in Schintz is susceptible of this interpretation. The 
decision is encouraging in that it will tend to limit the application 
of the Jones rule. 
The American cases evidently have not differentiated between 
the situations where the power to amend is restated in the will and 
where it appears only in the trust instrument. A will employing 
the language, "I hereby make the following disposition of my 
real and personal effects in accordance with the attached list of 
assets (made current by subsequent lists)" was upheld in In re 
Protheroe' s Estate13 on an incorporation by reference theory with-
out discussion of the fact that the power to amend appeared in the 
will itself. Of course the case did not deal with a bequest to an 
inter vivos trust and might be distinguished by some courts on 
this basis.14 In Clark v. Citizens National Bank a bequest to be 
held in accordance with the terms of an inter vivos charitable 
trust ". . . including such amendments to and modifications of 
the same, if any, as may hereafter and during my lifetime be 
made ... " was held invalid,15 but on the ground that the pre-
requisites for incorporation by reference and independent sig-
nificance were not met. By implication of the court's analysis, the 
mere reservation in the will of the power to amend the trust did 
not defeat the bequest. 
(2) Where the testator intends the property disposed of by 
his will to pass in accordance with the terms of the trust as they 
appeared when the will was executed, even though the trust may 
in fact be subsequently amended v. where the testator intends 
the property disposed of by his will to be governed by the terms 
of amendments to the trust which may be made after the execu-
12 Id. at 871. 
13 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W. (2d) 505 at 507. 
14 See Clark v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Collingswood, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d) 
108 (1955). 
15 Id. at 73, 74. 
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tion of the will. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland16 was a case 
in which a bequest was upheld on the ground that the testator 
did not intend subsequent amendments to the trust to affect 
the disposition of property under his will.17 Professor Palmer 
equated this type of situation with one involving an unamendable 
trust and would apply the same rules to both.18 In a recent New 
York case, however, where the will provided " ... I do not intend 
to incorporate in this my Last Will and Testament any future 
amendments which I may make to said Agreement [the inter vivos 
trust] ... ,"19 the court distinguished President and Directors of 
the Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz20 and upheld the bequest on the 
broader ground that an amendable trust may be incorporated by 
reference into a will if in fact no amendments are made sub-
sequent to the execution of the will.21 Query as to what decision 
the court would have reached had later amendments in fact been 
made in view of the express disclaimer by the testator of an intent 
to include them.22 
Since 1951 a number of courts have upheld bequests to the 
trustee of an amendable but unamended inter vivos trust, even 
though it is determined that the testator intended the property 
passing by will at his death to be governed by the terms of any 
amendments to the trust made after the execution of the will.23 
Although perhaps distinguishable, Montgomery v. Blankenship,24 
upholding a bequest incorporating a trust instrument where the 
. 16 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935). 
17 See Palmer, p. 45. 
1s Ibid. 
19 In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 at 460 (1953). 
20260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 232 (1940), where an amendment to the trust 
made subsequent to the execution of the will was held to have caused complete invalidity 
of the bequest. Discussed by Palmer at pp. 53, 61. 
21 Two alternative grounds for upholding the bequest were available to the court. 
It could have adopted the approach of Old Colony Trust Co. and treated the trust 
instrument as one not subject to modification or, as it chose to do, distinguished the 
Janowitz case on the ground that the trust instrument was not in fact amended subsequent 
to the e.xecution of the will. 
22 It might be argued that the court's failure to adopt the theory of the Old Colony 
Trust Co. case in a situation where it was so clearly available was an implied rejection of 
that theory. 
23 Forsythe v. Spielberger, (Fla. 1956) 86 S. (2d) 427; Stouse v. First Nat. Bank of 
Chicago, (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914; In re Ivie's Will, 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956), affd. 
3 App. Div. (2d) 914, 163 N.Y.S. (2d) 380 (1957), affd. 4 N.Y. (2d) 178, 173 N.Y.S. (2d) 293 
(1958); State of Indiana ex rel. Citizens Nat. Bank v. Superior Court of Madison County. 
(Ind. 1956) 138 N.E. (2d) 900. See also cases cited ·by Palmer, pp. 45, 46. 
24 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950). 
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trust was assumed to be invalid, and In re Protheroe's Estate,25 
recognizing the validity of a bequest incorporating an amendable 
·writing which was not a trust instrument, also support the above 
proposition. There are no contrary decisions among the recent 
cases. 
The Illinois court in Continental Illinois National Bank v. 
Art Institute26 sustained a bequest of the residuum of the testator's 
estate to the trustee of an inter vivos trust. The will made reference 
to the trust instrument and certain amendments thereto, but the 
importance of the decision as a precedent is lessened by the court's 
failure to address itself to the problems associated with incorpora-
tion of an amendable trust. 
A New York lower court decision, In re Snyder's Will,21 has up-
held a bequest to an amendable inter vivos trust on the broad 
ground that mere reservation of a power to amend, if not exercised, 
will not invalidate the disposition. The will expressly disclaimed 
any intent to incorporate later amendments, however, though the 
court failed to discuss this aspect of the case. 
In an interesting New Jersey decision28 dealing with the effect 
of a bequest of the testator's residuary estate to the trustee of an 
inter vivos trust for charitable purposes, the court found that the 
res of the trust had not been delivered until after the date of exe-
cution of the will, concluded that no trust was in existence at the 
time of the execution of the will, and decided, "It is unnecessary to 
here conclude whether the doctrine of incorporation by reference 
has been adopted or rejected in New Jersey, since in any event 
one of the essential elements is lacking, i.e., the existence of a 
valid trust on the date of the execution of the will." It was as-
sumed throughout the opinion that the trust instrument was in ex-
istence at the time the will was executed. This would have been 
sufficient ground to sustain the bequest in the majority of juris-
dictions which accept the incorporation by reference doctrine, 
as it is generally recognized that it is the trust instrument and not 
the trust itself which is incorporated into the will.29 The court 
25 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W. (2d) 505. 
26409 Ill. 481,100 N.E. (2d) 625 (1951). 
21125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953). 
28 Clark v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Collingswood, 38 N.J. Super. 69 at 78, 80, II8 A. 
(2d) 108 (1955). The case is criticized in l Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §54.3, pp. 16, 17 (1956; 
Supp. 1958). 
29 Palmer, pp. 39, 40, 42, 55. 
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went on to state: "In the matter sub judice resort is sought to the 
inter vivos trust in order to ascertain the disposition of the proper-
ty, the terms of the bequest. The testator attempted to dispose 
of his residue by a non-testamentary instrument. Such a gift is 
invalid, as the trust agreement has no independent significance, 
as above defined." The court's analysis on this issue, although con-
sistent with the state of authorities, points up the failure of cur-
rent legal opinion to achieve an integrated approach in the applica-
tion of the doctrine of independent significance to different types 
of factual situations. Even though the doctrine is accepted in a 
particular jurisdiction, the court must still decide at what time 
the independent significance of a given act is to be tested. A 
majority of courts require that the trust instrument have inde-
pendent significance at the time the will is executed (which 
means the trust must be in existence at this time), although this is 
not a limitation imposed in connection with application of the 
doctrine to acts which do not concern the creation or amendment 
of a trust. 30 Professor Palmer has suggested that the inconsistency 
results from the failure of the courts to divorce methods of analysis 
based on the doctrine of incorporation by reference, which re-
quires an existing trust instrument, from analysis based on inde-
pendent significance, and that courts carry over limitations from 
the former to the latter.31 
C. Where the Trust Was in Fact Amended or Revoked Sub-
sequent to the Execution of the Will. The effect of a subsequent 
amendment or revocation is not important if the mere reserva-
tion of the power to amend or revoke is held to invalidate the be-
quest. Nor should the amendment be important if the court 
in construing the will finds that the testator intended the property 
to pass in accordance with the terms of the original trust instru-
ment.32 But where the court finds that the testator intended the 
ao For example, a bequest to "the persons in my employ at my death," or "to the 
person who is my wife at my death" would not be invalidated for want of independent 
significance even though the employment relationship or the marriage was not created 
until after the execution of the will. See Palmer, p. 35. See also the illustrations cited 
by the TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(d) 3, 4, 5 (1955),' and the 
discussion of the Restatement •view in the text infra. 
31 Palmer, p. 55. See also TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(f) 
(1955), recognizing that resort to facts existing after the execution of the will is possible 
in certain pour-over trust situations under the doctrine of independent significance, and 
see discussion of the Restatement view in the text infra. 
32 Palmer, p. 51. But see note 22 supra. 
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property to pass by the terms of the trust instrument in the form 
it took at his death, and where the reservation of a power to amend 
does not defeat the bequest, additional problems are raised. It 
becomes necessary for a court to see the distinction between situa-
tions in which it is possible to give effect to an amendment by 
treating it as applicable to the corpus of the inter vivos trust only, 
as for example, a gift of a specific sum of money which can be 
satisfied out of the trust corpus, and situations in which the amend-
ment must be related to the property passing by the will in order 
to be given effect, e.g., a gift of land owned by the testator at 
death or a bequest to be distributed in the same proportions as 
the percentage shares held by the beneficiaries of the trust.33 
Amendments of the former type should be upheld and should not 
invalidate the bequest in any jurisdiction which will sustain a be-
quest to the trustee of an amendable inter vivos trust.34 In re Ivie's 
Will35 is a recent decision which lends some support to this 
conclusion. 
With respect to amendments to the trust which are meant 
to operate in relation to property owned at death, there are three 
alternatives: (1) uphold the bequest in accordance with the terms 
of the trust as amended, (2) uphold the bequest in accordance 
with the terms of the trust as they existed at the time of the exe-
cution of the will, (3) invalidate the entire bequest.36 In the first 
edition of his treatise on Trusts, Professor Scott advocated giving 
effect to later amendments, but if this was rejected he preferred 
complete invalidity to upholding the bequest in accordance with 
the terms of the trust as they appeared at the time of execution 
of the will.37 In his recent second edition Professor Scott has con-
cluded that giving effect to the bequest in accordance with the 
terms of the trust as they existed when the will was executed more 
closely approximates the testator's wishes in the typical case than 
complete invalidity of the bequest, and therefore reversed himself 
aa Palmer, pp. 52, 53. 
34 Palmer, p. 53. · 
315155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956). See discussion of this case in text infra. 
36 Palmer, pp. 53, 54. 
37 I Scorr, TRUSTS 299 (1939). Professor Palmer also advocates giving effect to later 
amendments which have in fact some independent significance, and agrees with the 
position now taken by Professor Scott in the second edition of his treatise should the 
courts refuse to give effect to the subsequent amendments. See Palmer, pp. 54, 59, 60, 
and note 38 infra. 
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as to the more desirable alternative should his preferred view be 
rejected by the courts.38 The recently adopted revision of the 
American Law Institute's Restatement of Trusts, in applying the 
doctrine of independent significance, takes the position that amend-
ments to the trust made after the execution of the will are gener- · 
ally effective.39 This view is subject to the criticism that it may not 
provide the courts with a sufficiently flexible approach to the 
problems which confront them. No court has yet expressed a 
willingness to give effect to a bequest in accordance with the terms 
of later amendments to the trust, 40 and the Restatement fails to 
suggest an alternate solution should the courts refuse to give effect 
to later amendments.41 Furthermore, although recognizing that 
the doctrine of independent significance can apply to facts which 
come into existence after the will is executed, the Restatement 
rigidly limits its application with respect to such later facts to those 
which have independent significance at the time of the death of 
the testator. According to the Restatement view the doctrine of 
independent significance can apply in the context of the pour-
over trust problem only to facts which have such significance either 
when the will is executed or at the death of the testator.42 This 
requires the existence of a valid trust at one of these two points 
38 I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 377 (1956). If the independent significance of the 
trust amendment in any particular case is not sufficient to require that it be given dis-
positive effect, it is doubtful that it can be used in arriving at a quantitative determina-
tion whether the testator would -have in fact preferred complete invalidity of the bequest 
as opposed to allowing the willed property to pass in accor_dance with the terms of the 
trust as they appeared when his will was executed. "The legal objection is that the 
provisions of an unattested writing ... [cannot be] used in construing the will .•.• " 
Palmer, p. 64. 
39 TRUSIS R.EsTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. Draft No. 2, §54(i) (1955). The Restatement 
of Trusts Second was approved and adopted by the A.L.I. in 1957. See 34th Annual 
Meeting, The American Law Institute, Proceedings, p. 279. 
40 See note 44 infra. 
41 However, where the bequest fails because, for example, there is no property in-
cluded in the trust at the testator's death, the Restatement suggests that later amendments 
may be excluded and the bequest be given effect in accordance with the terms of the trust 
as they appeared when the will was executed. See TRusrs RESIATEMENT SECOND, Tent. 
Draft No. 2, §54(i), illus. 9 (1955). 
42 Id., §54(i), and especially illus. 9. The reporter takes the position that where the 
testator manifests an intent " ... that the property bequeathed should be held upon 
the terms of the trust as they were at the time of the execution of the will, ... " the 
doctrine of independent significance can be utilized to uphold the bequest if the trust 
was in existence when the will was executed. Where the testator manifests an intent 
" ... that the property bequeathed should be held upon the terms of •the trust as they 
should be at the time of his death, ... " the reporter again recognizes that the bequest 
can be upheld by utilizing the doctrine of independent significance, provided that the 
trust was in existence at the time of the testator's death. 
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of time: when the will is executed if the testator does not intend his 
will to operate in accordance with later trust amendments; at the 
death of the testator if he intends the property disposed of by his 
will to go in accordance with later amendments to the trust. But 
the theory underlying this doctrine requires no such limitation. 
For example, a testator can bequeath property to persons now in 
his employ; to persons who will be in his employ at his death; or 
to persons who will be in his employ one year from the date of 
execution of his will. The time at which the independent signifi-
cance of a fact must be assessed cannot be arbitrarily established; 
it must be gleaned from the will itself. No doubt the testator usu-
ally intends his will to speak as of the time of execution or at 
the time of his death, but he is not limited to these two points of 
time. Suppose that a testator executes a will making a bequest 
to an amendable inter vivas trust which he intends to create at 
some future date, and expresses an intent that amendments to the 
trust are not to affect the dispositions made by his will; or sup-
pose that a testator makes a bequest to an existing amendable inter 
vivas trust and indicates that his will is to operate in accordance 
with any trust amendments and is not to be affected by a later 
revocation of the trust. If amendments are made to the trust in 
the first case, or if the trust is amended and then revoked in the 
second hypothetical situation, the doctrine of independent signifi-
cance as it is espoused by the Restatement could not be used to 
give effect to the testator's intent.43 A testator should be able to ac-
complish either of these results, and the doctrine of independent 
significance should be stated broadly enough to accommodate his 
needs. The Restatement view limiting the application of the doc-
trine to situations in which the trust was in existence at the time 
of the execution of the will or at the time of the death of the testa-
tor is an unwarranted restriction of its usefulness. 
43 With respect to the first hypothetical, the trust was not in existence when the 
will was executed and therefore had no independent significance at this point of time. 
Assuming it is in existence at the testator's death it has independent significance at this 
point, but only in its amended form. With respect to the second hypothetical, if the 
trust was in existence when the will was executed it had independent significance at this 
point, ,but it was not in existence at the death of the testator and therefore has no 
independent significance in its amended form. See TRUSTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tent. 
Draft No. 2, §54(i) and (j). The reporter recognizes that the principle underlying the 
rule of dependent relative revocation may be invoked to give effect to the bequest in 
the first hypothetical in accordance with the terms of the trust as they appeared at the 
testator's death, or in the second hypothetical in accordance with the terms of •the trust 
as they appeared when the will was executed. See id., §54(i), illus. 9. 
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The cases dealing with amendments meant to operate in rela-
tion to property owned at death are few, but no court at common 
law has given effect to a bequest in accordance with the terms 
of such an amendment to an inter vivos trust where the amend-
ment was made after the will was executed.44 With respect to 
the second and third alternatives mentioned above, the little 
available authority is in conflict.45 None of the recent decisions 
deal directly with this problem. Amendments made subsequent to 
the execution of the will, but drawn in accordance with the statute 
of wills, were given effect in Stouse v. First National Bank of 
Chicago.46 In dictum the court observed that subsequent amend-
ments not executed in accordance with the formalities required 
by the statute of wills would be disregarded and that the estate 
would pass by the terms of the trust instrument as they appeared 
at the time of execution of the will. The court in In re Ivie's Will41 
gave effect to subsequent amendments which concerned only the 
administration of the trust. It distinguished amendments of this 
type from amendments which are testamentary in nature and in 
dictum stated that the bequest is invalid if amendments of the 
latter type are made. The decision could be classified with those 
cases holding it possible to give effect to the amendment by treating 
it as an amendment of the trust alone. An amendment to an inter 
vivos trust was given effect as a part of the will in Forsythe v. Spiel-
berger,48 but on a pleading technicality. The complaint failed 
to allege that it was executed subsequent to the will and not in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the statute of wills. In dictum 
the court in Montgomery v. Blankenship49 stated that it would 
disregard subsequent amendments and give effect "to the provi-
sions of the trust as they existed at the time of execution of the 
will." Also in dictum, the court in In re Snyder's Will50 stated 
that amendment of the trust subsequent to the execution of the 
44 In 1951 Professor Palmer found no decision giving effect, in accordance with the 
terms of a trust amendment made after the execution of the will, to a disposition which 
operated in relation to property owned by the testator at death (Palmer, p. 54), and none 
has been located among the recent cases. 
45 Palmer, p. 61. 
46 (Ky. 1951) 245 S.W. (2d) 914. 
47 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 544 (1956), affd. 3 App. Div. (2d) 914, 163 N.Y.S. (2d) 380 (1957), 
affd. 4 N.Y. (2d) 178, 173 -N.Y.S. (2d) 293 (1958). 
48 (Fla. 1956) 86 S. (2d) 427. 
49 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950). 
50 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953). 
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will would invalidate the bequest. The same result can be implied 
from dictum in In re Protheroe's Estate.51 
Recent Statutes 
Legislation dealing with testamentary additions to the corpus 
of an inter vivas trust has been enacted in ten states. 52 The fore-
runner of these statutes was the Indiana act of 1953. Its influence 
can be seen in the form and language of the Illinois and North 
Carolina statutes which followed almost simultaneously in 1955, 
and which served as the basic prototypes for most of the subsequent 
legislation. The Nebraska statute, in the main, is a composite of the 
terms of the Illinois and North Carolina statutes; many of the 
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute have been taken from the 
North Carolina act, and the Mississippi statute to a large extent 
consists of provisions taken from the North Carolina and Illinois 
statutes. The Wyoming statute is a verbatim enactment of the 
Illinois statute. Wisconsin has adopted a different approach and 
its legislation in form is unrelated to the other statutes. The 
Connecticut and Oregon statutes are largely outside the main 
current of the liberalizing trend which runs through the legisla-
tion of the other states and in most instances will be treated 
separately. 53 
These statutes will be discussed in relation to their bearing 
upon the problems existing at common law, their prerequisites 
for applicability, and the new doubts and uncertainties introduced 
by the statutes themselves. 
A. Scope of Applicability-Unamendable, Amendable, and Re-
vocable Trusts. The Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming statutes all apply to unamendable, amendable, and revocable 
trusts. If the statutory prerequisites for applicability are met it 
is possible under these statutes to make a valid bequest to an inter 
vivos trust, whether or not such trust is amendable or revocable, 
51 (S.D. 1957) 85 N.W. (2d) 505. 
52 Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and ·wyoming. The text of each of these statutes is set out in 
full in the Appendix, infra. Compare the provisions of the Illinois and North Carolina 
statutes with the legislation suggested by Palmer, pp. 67-68. 
53 The Connecticut statute, although conservative when compared to the legislation 
of other states, should be read in the light of the rejection by the Connecticut courts 
of the doctrines of independent significance and incorporation by reference. See Hatheway 
v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A. 1058 (1907). 
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without repeating the trust terms in the will. The Oregon enact-
ment provides that a "bequest shall not be invalid because the trust 
is amendable," but the substantive rules established by the statute 
probably will also be held to apply to trusts where a power of rev-
ocation is reserved, either by interpreting the statutory language 
to be broad enough to comprehend such a power, 54 or by analogiz-
ing with the literal statutory language on the basis of legislative 
policy.55 
B. Statutory Prerequisites for Applicability. A written trust 
instrument, in existence at the time the will is "executed," and 
identified in the will, are express prerequisites for applicability 
of the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes.56 
North Carolina and Oregon require an existing written instru-
ment, but do not provide that it must be identified in the will.57 
To the extent that the application of these statutes depends upon 
an existing written trust instrument referred to in the will they 
are declaratory of the common law doctrine of incorporation by 
reference.58 The Pennsylvania statute sets up alternative condi-
tions of applicability with respect to the requirement of an exist-
ing written trust instrument. The statute provides that either a 
written trust instrument must be in existence when the will is 
executed, or that the trust instrument must be signed by the 
settlor if the writing is made at some future time after the execu-
tion of the will. The Connecticut statute also allows incorporation 
of a trust instrument into a will if in addition to the above pre-
requisites certain stipulated formalities are observed in the exe-
54 An analogous construction problem is encountered where a settlor reserves a 
power to modify the trust and the question arises whether this power includes the power 
to revoke. According to Scott " ... an unrestricted power to modify includes a power 
to revoke the trust." 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §331.2 (1956). 
55 Of course it is always possible to reach the opposite result by making a "statute 
in derogation of the common law" argument, and this argument may be especially 
strong here where the statute was obviously copied in part from the North Carolina act 
which specifically applies to revocable trusts. 
56 The term actually employed by these statutes is "made," but it presumably is 
synonymous with "executed." But see Berkeley v. Berkeley, [1946] A.C. 555 at 570-571. 
Although the decision dealt with construction of the term "provision" in §25 of the 
Finance Act of 1941, the question being whether it referred to the language of a will 
or the bequest itself, Lord Thankerton discussed a presumption indulged in under 
Scottish law that a will is "made" at the time of the testator's death. 
57 But even without an express provision to this effect the trust instrument must 
be sufficiently identified in the ~\Till to meet the standards of the statute of wills. See note 
68 infra. 
58 See discussion of the requirements of the common law doctrine, Palmer, p. 39. 
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cution of the trust instrument. 59 In Wisconsin the statute merely 
requires that the trust be "created by a written instrument." No 
provision is made for prior existence of the trust instrument or for 
its identification in the will. It could be argued that the Indiana 
statute does not require a written trust instrument so long as the 
" ... trust or trust fund ... is clearly identified in [the testator's] 
will" and" ... is in existence when [the testator's] will is executed." 
But the later reference in the statute to "instrument or instruments 
governing the trust or trust fund" will probably serve as sufficient 
indication that this statute also contemplates a writing.60 
The requirement that a written trust instrument must be in 
existence at the time the will is executed should be sharply dis-
tinguished from the question whether it is necessary that there be 
a valid and subsisting trust at this time. The issue is clearly pre-
sented by Clark v. Citizens National Bank of Collingswood61 where 
the trust instrument was in existence when the will was executed 
but the res of the trust was not delivered to the trustee until after 
the execution of the will. The Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and 
Wyoming statutes seem to be satisfied merely by the existence of 
the trust instrument when the will is executed, 62 while the North 
Carolina and Oregon statutes appear to require the existence of 
the trust as well prior to the execution of the will.63 It is recog-
nized, however, that this interpretation perhaps places too much 
emphasis on the use of the word "evidenced" in the Illinois, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming legislation (and the location of 
the modifying phrase "written instrument") as compared with "es-
tablished" as used in the North Carolina and Oregon enactments. 64 
59 The trust must be acknowledged by the settlor and witnessed by at least two 
persons. The Connecticut statute of wills requires three attesting witnesses. 3 Conn. 
Gen. Stat. (1949) §6951. 
60 "Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised shall be subject -to 
the terms and provisions of the instrument or instruments governing the trust or trust 
fund even though amended or modified after execution of the will." Emphasis added. 
6138 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d) 108 (1955). 
62 The Illinois statute provides that " ... a testator may devise and bequeath real 
and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in 
existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will. . . ." 
63 The North Carolina statute provides that "A devise or bequest in a will •.. may 
be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust established in writing prior to the 
execution of such will." 
64 See notes 62 and 63 supra. It could also be argued that the language of the Illinois, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes permitting a devise to the "trustee of a 
trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made ..• " 
(emphasis added) requires a valid and subsisting ,trust at this time. Even if these statutes 
are construed as not requiring the existence of the trust when the will is executed they 
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The Pennsylvania statute provides that the trust may be "estab-
lished" after the execution of the will if the trust instrument is 
signed by the settlor, and Connecticut requires only the existence 
of the trust instrument prior to the execution of the will. 65 The 
Indiana statute stipulates that the trust itself must be in existence 
when the will is executed. Wisconsin has taken a different ap-
proach and has conferred upon a trust "created by a written instru-
ment" entity status for the purposes of making it "eligible to re-
ceive property bequeathed, devised, or appointed."66 The statute 
does not speak on the question whether the trust must be in exist-
ence at the time the will is executed, but it would seem that the 
general rules applicable to devisees and legatees would control and 
that, as with any other entity eligible to receive property by will, 
a trust need not be in existence when the will is executed in order 
to be capable of receiving property under the will at the testator's 
death.67 
The conclusions reached with respect to the provisions of 
these statutes concerning the requirements of a trust instrument, 
in existence, and identified in the will are summarized below: 
(1) Each of these elements is a statutory prerequisite in Con-
necticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming. The North 
Carolina and Oregon statutes require a writing in existence; al-
though they do not expressly provide for its identification in the 
will, some means of identification must of course be contained 
in the language of the will. 68 
(2) Pennsylvania requires a writing, but it need not be in 
existence at the time the will is executed if signed by the settlor. 
If it is in existence at the time the will is executed it need not be 
signed. No express provision is made by the Pennsylvania statute 
for identification of the writing in the will. 
still may be construed to require its existence at the testator's death. See discussion of 
these· statutes in text infra relating to revocation of the trust. The Mississippi and Nebraska 
statutes expressly provide that revocation prior to the testator's death revokes the bequest. 
65 The Connecticut statute provides that the "document creating . . . [the] trust" 
be in existence when the will is executed. Although this language is probably merely 
descriptive of •the nature of the document, it might be argued that the statute requires 
the existence of the trust itself at this time. 
66 No provision is made in the Wisconsin statute for identification of the trust in the 
will. However, like every other devisee or legatee it must be sufficiently identifiable to 
meet the standards of the statute of wills. See 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 1233, 1234 (1951). 
67 See 1 JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 108, 116 (1951); 3 id., 1689-1697. 
6SSee 2 id., 1233-1246. 
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(3) In Wisconsin a writing is required. The statute makes no 
provision with respect to identification of the trust instrument in 
the will and does not require that it be in existence when the 
will is executed. The Indiana statute will probably also be con:-
strued to require a written trust instrument, and in this connection 
the requirements that the writing be in existence at the time the 
will is executed and that it be identified in the will may also b~ 
read into the statute. 
The interpretations made of the different statutes with respect 
to the requirement that the trust itself be in existence when the 
will is executed may be summarized as follows: 
(I) The Connecticut and Wisconsin statutes do not require 
that the trust be in existence when the will is executed. The pro-
visions of the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wyoming statutes 
are less clear, but will probably be similarly construed. 
(2) The existence of a valid trust when the will is executed i~ 
a prerequisite to the application of the Indiana, North Carolina, 
and Oregon statutes. 
(3) Under the Pennsylvania statute the trust need not be in 
existence when the will is executed if the trust instrument is signed 
by the settlor. 
If the above statutory interpretations are correct the bequest 
in Clark v. Citizens National Bank of Collingswood69 would be 
upheld under the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming statutes, as the trust instrument was in existence when 
the will was executed. It would be invalid under the Pennsylvania 
statute unless the trust instrument was signed by the settlor, and 
invalid under the Connecticut statute because the trust instrument 
was not witnessed or acknowledged. The bequest would fail under 
the Indiana, North Carolina, and Oregon statutes because the trust 
was not in existence when the will was executed. 
Where the bequest would be invalid under statute the further 
problem remains whether it could be upheld at common law. In 
other words, the question becomes: do the statutes displace com-
mon law rules, or do they merely constitute other means for up-
holding a bequest to the corpus of an inter vivas trust in addition 
to those existing at common law? The common law doctrine of 
incorporation by reference, for example, demands only the exist-
ence of the trust instrument, not the trust itself, prior to the ex-
69 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A. (2d) 108 (1955). 
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ecution of the will. The initial question with which a court faced 
with a problem of this type would be confronted is whether the 
statute is indicative of a legislative intent to preempt the entire 
field.70 A finding that the statute abolished all the common law 
-rules pertaining to incorporation by reference of an instrument 
creating an inter vivos trust is unlikely in view of the obvious 
purpose of the legislation to facilitate the upholding of such 
bequests. The next question is whether the particular common 
law rule under consideration has been changed by the statute. 
The North Carolina statute, for example, provides that "A devise 
or bequest in a will ... may be made in form or substance to the 
trustee of a trust established in writing prior to the execution of 
such will." The critical language is "may be." Does this mean 
"may only be"? The legislative purpose to liberalize the common 
law rule and the fact that imperative language was not employed 
make probable a finding that the common law doctrine of incorpor-
ation by reference was not affected by the statute. 
C. Effect of an Amendment of th"e Trust Subsequent to the 
Execution of the Will. Under the Connecticut statute the bequest 
is invalidated if the trust is amended subsequent to the execution 
of the will or codicil in which it is made, but it can be reinstated 
by republication in a later codicil to the will. The language of the 
Oregon statute declaring that a bequest to an inter vivos trust 
· shall not be invalid ". . . provided that the will or the last codicil 
thereto vyas executed subsequent to the time of execution of the 
trust instrument and all amendments thereto" seems to imply that 
the bequest is void where the trust is amended after execution of 
the will or last codicil.71 Under this construction the net effect of 
these two statutes is merely to allow a testator to make a bequest 
to the corpus of an amendable inter vivos trust without repeating 
the terms of the trust in the will. Any modification of the trust 
provisions must be carried out in conjunction with a re-execution 
of the will or execution of codicil thereto or else the bequest is to 
70 This, of course, must assume that the jurisdiction in question has accepted the 
common law doctrine of incorporation by reference. 
71 In support of a more liberal construction of the Oregon statute it could be argued 
that all that is affirmatively required is that a bequest to an inter vivos trust shall not 
be held invalid if the will -was executed following all trust amendments, that it does 
not establish any rule of law with respect to trusts which have been amended after ex-
ecution of the will, and that the courts are left free to establish their own rules for such 
cases. If this was really the legislative intent, however, the statute is poorly drafted. 
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be void.72 Both statutes require that the bequest be held invalid if 
the will is not re-executed after amendment of the trust even 
though the trust amendment was minor with respect to the overall 
dispositive scheme. Further, although it should be possible to 
avoid this construction, strict adherence to the statutory language 
would require invalidity of the bequest if the will is not repub-
lished after trust amendments even where the testator has expressly 
disclaimed in his will an intent to include later amendments to the 
trust. 73 However, where the settlor of the trust is someone other 
than the testator or where a power of amendment is vested in some 
other person, there is little doubt that the courts will depart from 
the literal meaning of these statutes rather than read them as 
requiring that the bequest be held invalid if the trust is amended 
after the death of the testator.74 
If an amendment is made in writing after the execution of the 
will and before the death of the testator, the willed property passes 
72 The Connecticut statute does allow "addition to or withdrawal of any or all assets 
from said trust or a change of the trustee or trustees of such trust ..• " without requir-
ing re-execution of the will. Compare the provisions of this statute with the decision in 
In re Ivie's Will, note 47 supra, where the court recognized that amendments to the 
trust made after the execution of the will but which concerned only the administration 
of the trust did not invalidate the bequest. 
73 The Connecticut statute stipulates that "if such trust by its terms may be . . . 
amended, such devise or bequest shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution 
of such will or codicil, the trust is ••. amended . . . ,'' and the Oregon statute that 
"Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable by the 
settlor or any other person or persons, provided that the will or the last codicil thereto 
was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust instrument and all amend-
ments thereto." It seems doubtful that these statutes were meant to apply to situations 
where the testator did not intend amendments to the trust made after his will was executed 
to affect the dispositive provisions of his will. The legislative purpose was to liberalize 
,the common law rules in order to facilitate the upholding of bequests made to the corpus 
of an inter vivos trust, not to add new barriers to those already existing. In most common 
law jurisdictions a bequest of this type would be upheld. 
74 See the language of the statutes in note 73 supra. It is doubtful that the 
courts will construe them as requiring invalidity of the bequest where amendments to 
the trust are made after the ,testator's death even though neither statute expressly provides 
a cut-off time for the operation of the provisions invalidating the bequest because of 
amendments made after the execution of the will. See in this respect the terms of the 
Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wyoming statutes establishing the 
death of the testator as the last point of time at which trust amendments are to have 
any effect upon the testator's will. An analogous principle that the validity of the bequest 
is to be tested as of ,the time of the death of the testator will probably be read into the 
Connecticut and Oregon statutes as it is unlikely that either legislature was concerned 
with the effect of trust amendments made after the testator's death. The limitations 
imposed upon the amount of discretion which the trustee or some other person may 
exercise in relation to the trust after the death of the testator is more properly a matter 
for the law of trusts rather than the law of wills. See 1 JARMAN, 'WILLS, 8th ed., 496-497 
(1951). 
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in accordance with the terms of the amended trust under the 
Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wyoming 
statutes unless the will provides otherwise. By implication it is 
possible to argue that amendments to the trust made after the 
death of the testator are not effective with respect to the willed 
property.75 
The Indiana and Pennsylvania statutes require that unless it 
is otherwise provided in the will the property disposed of under 
the will shall pass in accordance with the terms of the trust as 
amended. Where a power to amend is vested in some person other 
than the testator these statutes are broad enough to allow amend-
ments to the trust relating to the willed property and made after 
the death of the testator to be given effect.76 
The Wisconsin statute provides that an amendment of the 
trust made after the execution of the will is effective to change 
the dispositive provisions of the will with respect to property 
passing to the trust at the testator's death, and like the Indiana and 
Pennsylvania legislation it is broad enough to comprehend amend-
ments made by some person other than the testator after his 
death.77 
The problem deserving special consideration is raised by the 
75 The wording of the North Carolina statute, "Unless the will provides otherwise, 
such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of property under the terms of the trust 
as they appear in writing at the testator's death ... ," however, makes this construction 
unlikely, as it is possible to contend with some force that the legislature was concerned 
only with ,the effect of a bequest up to the time of the testator's death and that there 
was no intent to legislate with respect to trust amendments made after the testator's death. 
And even if the statute does apply to amendments made after the testator's death a 
power to amend the trust held by some person other than the testator should be ex-
ercisable with respect to the ,'villed property if such power was reserved "under ,the terms 
of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death." These same arguments are 
more difficult to make under the provisions of ,the Illinois, Mississippi, Nebraska, and 
Wyoming statutes which read: "Unless the will provides othenvise the estate so devised 
and bequeathed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating 
the trust including any amendments or modifications in writing made at any time before 
or after the making of the will and before the death of the testator." (Emphasis added.) 
It might also be argued •that these statutes allow the .testator to stipulate in his will that 
trust amendments made after his death are to be given effect. 
76 The operative provisions of both these statutes allow later amendments to be given 
effect and no cut-off time is established by the statutes limiting the application of these 
provisions. Compare note 75 supra. Under the Pennsylvania statute an amendment to 
a trust established after the execution of the testator's will must be signed by the settlor. 
However, the settlor may be some person other than the testator. 
77 See note 76 supra. It could be argued, however, that the provisions of the Wisconsin 
statute sub. (6) stipulating that amendments of the trust made after •the execution of the 
will are effective to change the disposition of the willed property "even though the will 
is not re-executed or republished" contemplates the continued existence of the testator 
and therefore applies only to amendments made during his lifetime. 
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terms of the will in In re Snyder's Will18 which provided ". . I 
do not intend to incorporate in this my Last Will and Testament 
any future amendments which I may make to said Agreement [the 
inter vivos trust]." Suppose that after such a will is executed 
amendments are made to the trust. As observed above, unless the 
will is re-executed the bequest could be held invalid under the 
Connecticut and Oregon statutes. But if the will is republished or 
if these statutes are held not to apply to trusts where the later 
amendments subsequent to the trust amendments are not intended 
to affect the will, the testator's intent that his will should exclude 
the later trust amendments will be carried out.79 Similarly the later 
amendments will be excluded under the Illinois, Indiana, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming stat-
utes.80 The Wisconsin statute, however, contains the affirmative 
stipulation that a trust amendment "shall be effective" to alter the 
provisions of the will, which would seem to require that the terms 
of the trust are to control in every case. 81 Where the testator indi-
cates at the time he amends the trust that he has changed his mind 
and now intends the willed property to pass in accordance with the 
terms of the amended trust this legislation perhaps serves the use-
ful purpose of giving effect to the most recent expression of the 
testator's intent, but it is difficult to see any justification for requir-
ing the terms of the trust as amended to control when this would 
be contrary to the testator's intention. This provision of the Wis-
consin statute will undoubtedly serve as another pitfall for the un-
wary in this area. 
D. Effect of a Revocation of the Trust Subsequent to the Execu-
tion of the Will. The discussion of these statutes relating to the ef-
fect of revocation of the inter vivos trust could be in part re-
1s 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 at 460 (1953). 
79 Both statutes are phrased in negative terms, i.e., in Connecticut "No devise or 
bequest given in any will or codicil or republication thereof in any codicil shall be deemed 
invalid by reason of any reference therein to any document creating a trust .• .'' and 
in Oregon "Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable by 
the settlor or any other person or persons .•. " leaving the courts free to carry out the 
testator's intent to exclude later amendments. Compare discussion of the Wisconsin statute 
in the text infra. 
so All these statutes make express provision for the situation where the testator 
intends to exclude later amendments ·to the trust by stipulating that amendments made 
after the will may be given effect "unless the will provides otherwise." 
81 It should be noted that an ambiguity exists in the Wisconsin statute -because of 
the provision in sub. (2) that a trust shall be eligible to receive property bequeathed or 
devised by the "settlor and others" and the use of the term "settlor's" will in sub. (3). 
"Settlor's" in sub. (3) will probably be read as "testator's." 
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phrased in terms of the question whether there need be a valid 
trust in existence at the death of the testator. In this latter form it 
is clear that this question must be related to the question treated 
above regarding whether there need be a valid trust in existence 
when the will is executed. 
The Mississippi, Nebraska, and North Carolina statutes pro-
vide that a revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death in-
validates the bequest.82 The same result is required by the Pennsyl-
vania statute "unless the will directs otherwise."83 The Connecticut 
act does not differentiate between revocations prior or subsequent 
to the testator's death; and, although it probably will not be so 
construed with respect to the latter, a literal reading of the statu-
tory language would demand invalidation of a bequest to any trust 
which had been revoked after execution of the will. 84 
The Illinois, Indiana, and Wyoming statutes do not expressly 
spell out what effect a later revocation of the trust is to have on the 
will. The first sentence of the Illinois and Wyoming statutes allows 
a bequest to be made to the trustee of a trust "even though the 
trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termina-
tion." The second sentence of these statutes states: "Unless the 
will provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall 
be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating 
the trust including any amendments or modifications ... made ... 
before the death of the testator." The most probable inference 
82 "An entire revocation of the trust prior -to the testator's death shall invalidate 
the devise or bequest." Under the terms of these statutes the bequest fails upon revocation 
of -the trust even though the testator stipulates in his will that such revocation is to have 
no effect upon the property passing at death. See discussion in text supra on the effect 
of an amendment to the trust where the testator does not intend it to affect the terms 
of .his will, and see In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 459 (1953). 
83 In declaring that a revocation of the trust "shall invalidate the devise or bequest" 
the Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania statutes all include the 
modifying phrase "prior to the testator's death." One inference which might be drawn 
from the use of the imperative "shall" is that the validity of the bequest shall not be 
affected by a revocation made after the testator's death, but a more probable construction 
of the statutes is that they leave untouched the common law rules relating to such revoca-
tions. See discussion in text supra with respect to these statutes regarding amendments 
to the trust made after the death of the testator. 
84 "No devise or bequest given in any will or codicil or republication thereof in any 
codicil shall be deemed invalid ,by reason of any reference therein to any document creat-
ing a trust • . . provided, if such trust by its ,terIDS may be revoked • • . such devise or 
bequest shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution of such will or codicil, 
the trust is revoked .... " See discussion in text supra with respect to the Connecticut 
statute regarding amendments to the trust made after the death of the testator, and 
see note 74 supra. 
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from the legislatures' use of the term "revocation" in the first 
sentence and its omission from the second sentence is that they did 
not intend to change the common law rule governing the effect 
of a revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death.85 At com-
mon law a revocation of the entire trust prior to the death of the 
testator would probably cause the bequest to fail.86 Revocation of 
the trust after the testator's death is a matter dealt with by the 
law of trusts, not the law of wills. 87 If the term "modified" in the 
Indiana statute is construed to include trusts which are "revoked" 
after the will is executed, the language providing that the property 
devised "shall be subject to the terms ... of the ... instruments 
governing the trust" requires that a revocation prior to the testa-
tor's death cause invalidity of the bequest.88 The operation of the 
Indiana statute under this construction with respect to a revocation 
occurring after the testator's death is not clear. If a bequest to a 
revocable trust is upheld at common law it would seem that upon 
the death of the testator the property added to the trust should be 
treated in the same manner as the rest of the trust corpus. There is 
no special virtue to a testamentary addition to a trust corpus as 
compared with property placed in the trust during the lifetime of 
the testator. A later revocation of the trust has no relation- whatso-
ever to the validity of the bequest, and the disposition of the trust 
corpus after revocation depends upon the law of trusts, not the law 
of wills.89 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to change the 
85 It might also be argued, however, that the omission of "revocation" from the 
second sentence of these statutes is indicative of an affirmative legislative intent that tlie 
estate bequeathed shall not be governed by revocations before the death of the testator. 
Compare note 75 supra. It is even less likely that the legislature intended to deal with 
the effect of a revocation of the trust after the testator's death. Compare note 74 supra, 
but see discussion in the text supra concerning the statutory prerequisites for applicability 
where the possibility of legislative preemption is considered. 
86 Palmer concludes that the common law effect of the revocation of an inter vivos 
trust prior to the death of the testator should depend upon the testator's intent when 
he executes his will, and cites Fifth Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 
73, 70 N.E. (2d) 920 (1946), in support of this proposition. Palmer, p. 65. It would seem, 
however, that those courts which hold that amendments to the trust after the will is 
executed cause the bequest to fail will treat revocations similarly. See notes 44 and 45 
supra. There is almost no authority directly on point. 
87 See note 85 supra and see discussion in the text infra on ,the common law effect of 
a revocation of the trust after the testator's death. 
ss "Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised shall be subject to 
the terms and provisions of the •.. instruments governing the trust ... even though ..• 
modified after execution of the will." 
89 The testator may, of course, make provision in his will for the disposition of the 
property bequeathed to the trust in the event of its revocation after -his death, or such 
provision may be made in the trust itself. In the absence of stipulations to the contrary, 
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common law rules governing revocation, after the death of the 
testator, of trusts to which bequests have been made,90 but on the 
postulated construction that the statute does not differentiate be-
tween revocations prior to and after the testator's death, and if 
those prior to his death cause invalidity it could be argued that 
those subsequent to it should have the same effect. If the above con-
stru_ction of the term "modified" in the Indiana statute is rejected 
the common law rule still prevails both as to revocations of the 
trust prior to and after the testator's death.91 
As pointed out above there is some doubt whether the Oregon 
statute even applies to trusts where a power of revocation is re-
serv~d. 92 If the term "amendment" in the Oregon statute is con-
strued to include "revocation" then revocation of the trust would 
cause invalidity of the bequest whether or not the "will or last 
codicil thereto" was executed subsequent to such revocation.93 If 
the statuto_ry rule does not apply either by construction or analogy 
tq situations involving_ revocation of the trust then the common 
law rule is still in force and revocation prior to the testator's death 
probably will cause the bequest to fail.94 
Th(Wisc~nsin statute, subsection (3), provides that "any or 
all of the pow~rs listed in subsection (1) may be exercised without 
aff~ctJng the validity of the trust, ... and its independent existence 
and eligibility for the receipt of property ... " by will. Among the 
a revocation of the trust after the testator's death would give rise to a resulting trust in 
favor of the settlor or his heirs and this resulting trust would embrace both the property 
originally 'placed in the trust fund and the property which passed to it at the testator's 
death. In some jurisdictions the property passing to the trust by will would be adminis-
ter~d as a sep~rate testamentary trust. See note 101 infra. 
90 Compare notes 74·and 75 supra, and see discussion in the text supra dealing with 
the statutory prerequisites for applicability regarding the purpose for which these statutes 
were enacted'.' and their possible effect upon the existing common law rules. 
91 See note 86 supra regarding the common law effect of revocations prior to the 
testator's death. It should be pointed out, however, that the Indiana statute is couched 
in affirmative language, i.e., "such devise shall -be valid and effective." If the term 
"modified" in the second sentence does not apply to revocations it could be argued 
that a revocation of the trust after execution of the will does not affect the bequest. 
92Notes 54 and 55 supra. 
93 "Such· devise or bequest shall not be invalid ... provided that the will or last 
codicil thereto was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust instrument 
and all amendments thereto." If the will or last codicil was executed after the revocation 
of the trust the revocation would be given effect and the bequest would fail; if not 
executed subsequent to the revocation of ,the trust the bequest would be invalid under 
the provisions of the statute. 
94 See note 86 supra. As to the common law rule governing the effect of revocations 
of the trust after the death of the testator, see notes 87 and 89 supra. 
1958] COMMENTS 108 
powers listed in subsection (I) is the power to revoke. This portion 
of the statute therefore seems to indicate that the trust may be 
revoked and still be eligible to receive the bequest. Subsection (3) 
further provides that " ... the exercise of a power under subsec-
tion (l)(a) to amend, alter or modify the provisions of the [trust] 
instrument shall be effective to change such provisions as to the 
property devised, bequeathed or appointed by will ... ," the im-
plication being that the exercise of the power to revoke, also listed 
in subsection (l)(a) need not be given this effect. (It should be 
observed that this latter provision is phrased in the imperative, 
not the permissive form.) The import of these two provisions taken 
together seems to be that the effect of a revocation of the trust on 
the validity of the bequest depends upon the intent of the testa-
tor.95 If he intends the revocation to cause the bequest to fail, this 
intent will be carried out; if he intends the revocation to have 
no effect on the bequest, the bequest will be upheld. It is rec-
ognized, however, that this construction is inconsistent with the 
general overall approach of the Wisconsin statute in treating the 
trust as an entity.00 · 
Only the Pennsylvania statute expressly makes provision for 
the situation where the testator intends the property owned at 
death to pass under the terms of the trust even though it is sub-
sequently revoked.9'l. The-Wisconsin statute will probably be inter-
preted to reach the same result, and the Indiana statute can be 
construed in a similar fashion by reading the language referring to 
trusts which have been "modified" after execution of the will as 
applicable to revocations or, along with the Illinois and Wyoming 
statutes, by a finding that the common law rules dealing with the 
effect of a revocation of the trust are still in force. 
E. Statutory Provisions Relating to the Trust. (1) Established 
by the testator v. ·established by persons other· than the testator. 
In considering the applicability of the statutes to bequests to trusts 
generally it has been tacitly assumed up to now that a bequest 
95 It might also be argued that the failure to include the power to revoke among 
the powers listed in the latter clause of sub. (3) implies that the exercise of the power 
to revoke shall not "be effective to change such provisions as to property devised, be-
queathed or appointed by will," or in other words that a bequest cannot be revoked 
by revocation of the trust. Compare notes 83 and 85 supra. 
96 Without stipulations to the contrary in the will a bequest to an entity not in 
existence at the death of the testator will lapse. See I JARMAN, WILLS, 8th ed., 438 (1951). 
97 "An entire revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the 
devise or bequest unless the will directs otherwise." Emphasis added. 
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could be made by the testator either to a trust established by him-
self or by some other person. Such an assumption is warranted by 
the express provisions of the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin stat-
utes.98 The Connecticut statute applies only to bequests to inter 
vivos trusts established by the testator, his or her spouse, or a 
parent or child of the testator.99 
The statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Wyoming are all broad enough to read 
upon trusts established by persons other than the testator, and 
doubtless will be so construed by the courts.100 
(2) Testamentary trust v. inter vivos trust. Some courts have 
indicated that the common law doctrine of incorporation by 
reference requires that the property passing by will to the trustee 
of an inter vivos trust be placed in a separate testamentary trust 
rather than added to the corpus of the inter vivos trust.101 The 
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania statutes 
stipulate that unless the will provides otherwise the property 
"shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust."102 The 
Wisconsin and Connecticut statutes contain language of similar 
import,103 but in the latter state the property passing by will "shall 
be administered as a testamentary trust" if any trustee· resides or 
has its principal place of business outside of Connecticut. 
The statutes of Illinois, Indiana, Oregon, and Wyoming make 
no provision with respect to this problem. 
(3) Existence of the trust at the testator's death. The question 
whether the trust need be in existence at the death of the testator, 
98 The Pennsylvania statute provides that the trust may be established " ••. by 
the testator or any other person ... " and the Wisconsin statute declares that the trust 
shall -be eligible to receive property from ". . _. the settlor and others. . • ." 
99 The Connecticut statute provides that the document creating the trust must be 
executed .by " ... the testator, his or iher spouse, or a parent or child of such testator 
as settlor of such trust. . . ." 
100 But see Commissioner's comment on the Indiana statute to the effect that it is 
limited to public charitable trusts. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953) §6.601(j). 
lOlSee Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 239 S.W. (2d) 758 (1950), and 
dictum in fa re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435 at 436, 65 A. (2d) 282 (1949). But see 1 Scorr, 
TRusrs, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 382 (1956). 
102 The Nebraska statute provides ,that the trust will be deemed nontestamentary 
only if " ... the designated trustee is a corporate trustee authorized by law to act as 
an executor or administrator." 
103 The Wisconsin statute provides in sub. (2) that "No reference ,to any such trust 
in any will shall cause the trust assets to be included in the property administered as 
part of the testator's estate" and in sub. (3) that "Any or all of the powers listed in sub. 
(I) may be exercised without affecting the validity of the trust, its non-testamentary 
character ...• " 
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i.e., whether the validity of the bequest is dependent upon the 
existence of at least a nominal trust corpus at his death, might 
well have been taken up in conjunction with the prerequisites for 
applicability of the statutes.104 It obviously must also be correlated 
with the problems associated with revocation of the trust prior 
to the testator's death. The Wisconsin statute provides that a 
trust shall be eligible to receive property by will ". . . whatever 
the size or character of its corpus .... " Although this language 
arguably contemplates the existence of some corpus, nominal or 
otherwise, at the testator's death, it probably will be construed to 
require no corpus at all. The operation of the Connecticut statute 
which stipulates that " ... mere addition to or withdrawal of any 
or all assets from said trust ... " will not cause invalidity of the be-
quest is also independent of the size of the trust corpus at the 
testator's death, although it may be contended that a nominal 
corpus is required at the time the will is executed.105 No reference 
is made to the size of the trust corpus in any of the other statutes, 
and thus the existence of a nominal corpus at the testator's death, 
though perhaps not required by all, will suffice to satisfy the 
provisions of any of them.106 
As pointed out above, the Mississippi, Nebraska, North Car-
olina, and Pennsylvania statutes expressly provide that a revocation 
of the trust prior to the testator's death invalidates the bequest.107 
Therefore, insofar as a withdrawal of the entire corpus of the 
trust may be held to constitute a revocation, these statutes require 
the existence of at least a nominal corpus at the death of the 
testator.108 Similarly with respect to the Indiana, Illinois, and 
Wyoming statutes, under which it was concluded that the common 
104 See discussion in text supra concerning the requirement that the trust be in 
existence when the will is executed. 
105 See note 65 supra. 
100 Some writers are of the opinion that a nominal corpus will not suffice to sustain 
a bequest to an inter vivos trust under the common law doctrine of independent signifi-
cance. See I Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §54.3, p. 382 (1956). It has been suggested that some 
of these statutes may be considered by the courts to be enactments of the independent 
significance doctrine. See 69 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1147 (1956). See also Palmer, p. 69 ,criticizing 
the requirement of a specific minimum trust corpus. 
107 Note 82 supra. The Pennsylvania statute allows the testator to avoid this result 
by providing otherwise in his will. 
10s No doubt a withdrawal of the entire trust corpus terminates the trust, but Profes-
sor Scott is of the opinion that such a withdrawal does not necessarily bring to an end 
fiduciary relationships which existed by virtue of the trust. See I Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., 
§74.2 (1956). In other words, termination by withdrawal may not be the equivalent of 
termination by revocation, and <the statutes make specific reference only to the latter. 
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law rules relating to revocation of the trust prior to the testator's 
death may still be in force, if a withdrawal of all the trust assets 
constitutes a revocation then a nominal corpus may be required.109 
Conclusions 
Although there are significant differences in both statute and 
case law in the various jurisdictions, a few generalizations with 
respect to the overall status of the problems relating to testamen-
tary additions to the corpus of an inter vivos trust are possible: 
(I) The current trend of both judicial and legislative develop-
ments is toward a more liberal attitude in upholding such 
transactions. 
(2) There have apparently been no decisions handed down 
since 1951 in which the court has struck down a bequest because 
it was made to an amendable or revocable trust; and the existing 
statutes all provide that a bequest shall not be invalid because of 
the mere reservation of a power to alter the trust terms. 
(3) Where the trust has been modified after the execution of 
the will no court without the aid of statute has expressed a willing-
ness to give effect to the bequest in the amended form. From the 
dicta in the cases, opinion appears to be split on the question 
whether such a bequest should be declared totally invalid or should 
be upheld in accordance with the terms of the trust when the will 
was executed. In general the statutes have adopted a more liberal 
approach, and the majority of them allow the willed property to 
pass by the terms of the amended trust, even where the amend-
ment has no independent significance and relates only to the estate 
owned at death. 
(4) The provisions of a number of the statutes are apparently 
satisfied by the existence of the trust instrument prior to the ex-
ecution of the will and do not require that the trust itself be in 
existence at this time, although several of the statutes are unclear 
on this point. No statute imposes a minimum on the amount of 
property which must be placed in the corpus of the inter vivos 
trust during the life of the testator except as they may be read to 
require the existence of the trust itself when the will is executed, 
though some of them may be construed to require at least a nom-
inal trust corpus at his death. 
109 Revocation at common law may not cause invalidity of the entire bequest. See 
note 86 supra. 
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(5) Some of the shortcomings of the existing statutes in this area 
would include a failure expressly to distinguish between amend-
ments and revocations prior to and after the testator's death, a 
lack of clarity with respect to the question whether the trust itself 
must be in existence when the will is executed or at the testator's 
death, and the fact that no stipulation is made of their intended 
effect on the pre-existing common law rules dealing with the 
doctrines of independent significance and incorporation by 
reference. 
Richard I. Singer, S.Ed. 
APPENDIX 
CONNECTICUT 
[Conn. Pub. Acts, Jan. Sess. 1957, P.A. No. 575] 
Section 2929d of the 1955 supplement to the general statutes is repealed and the fol• 
lowing is substituted in lieu ,thereof: No devise or bequest given in any will or codicil 
or republication thereof in any codicil shall be deemed invalid by reason of any reference 
therein to any document creating a trust, which document was executed and acknowledged 
by the testator, his or her spouse, or a parent or child of such testator as settlor of such 
trust and witnessed by at least two persons and was in existence at the time of the ex-
ecution of such will or codicil and is identified in such will or codicil by reference to 
the names of the parties who executed such document and the date of such execution, 
and such a devise or bequest may be made to the trustee or trustees of such trust; 
provided, if such trust by its terms may be revoked or amended, such devise or bequest 
shall be deemed invalid, if, subsequent to the execution of such will or codicil, the trust 
is revoked or amended, provided mere addition to or withdrawal of any or all assets 
from said trust or a change of the trustee or trustees of such trust, if such substitute 
trustee or trustees be a corporate trustee authorized to act as such within this state and 
such amendment is in accordance with the terms thereof, shall not be deemed a revoca-
tion or amendment within the meaning of the provisions hereof. Such reference in a 
will or codicil to such trust document by which a devise or ,bequest is made to such 
trust shall not thereby cause such trust or such part of the assets thereof distributed to 
it by such devise or bequest to be subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court in 
which such will or codicil is admitted to probate unless any trustee thereof resides or 
has its principal place of business outside of the state, in which· event the provisions of 
such document of trust, if all other provisions of this section have been complied with, 
shall be deemed incorporated in such will or codicil, and such bequest or devise shall 
be administered as a testamentary trust under the continuing jurisdiction of the probate 
court in which such will or codicil is admitted to probate. 
lu.INOIS 
[Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 3, §194a] 
By a will signed and attested as provided in this Act a testator may devise and be-
queath real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written 
instrument in existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even 
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termination. Unless 
the will provides othenvise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall be governed by 
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments 
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and 
before the death of the testator. 
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INDIANA 
[Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953 rep!.) §6-6010)] 
If a testator devises real or personal property to be added to a trust or trust fund 
which is clearly identified in his will and which is in existence when his will is executed, 
such devise shall be valid and effective. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property 
so devised shall be subject to the terms and provisions of the instrument or instruments 
governing the trust or trust fund even though amended or modified after execution 
of the will. 
MISSISSIPPI 
[Senate Bill No. 1928, approved, May 6, 1958] 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Mississippi; 
Section I. That a devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 657 of Mississippi Code of 1942 may ,be made to the trustee of a trust which 
is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made and which is 
identified in the will. Such devise or ·bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is 
amendable or revocable or both by the settler or any other person or persons; nor because 
the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required 
for wills; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless the will 
provides otherwise, such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of the property under 
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments 
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and 
before the death of the testator, and the property shall not be deemed held under a 
testamentary· trust. An entire revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall 
invalidate the devise or bequest. 
Section 2. That the provisions of this Act shall apply to all devises or bequests made 
in any will duly executed according to Section 657 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, of 
any testator dying after the effective date of this Act, whether the will is executed before 
or after the effective date of this Act. 
Section 3. That the term "will" in this Act shall include and refer to the term 
"codicil." 
Section 4. That this Act shall be in force and effect from and after its passage. 
NEBRASKA 
[Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; Cum. Supp. 1957) §30-1806] 
A -testator may by will, devise and bequeath real and personal property to a trustee 
of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made 
and which is identified in the will, even though the trust is subject to amendment, modifi-
cation, revocation, or termination. Unless the will provides otherwise, the estate so devised 
and bequeathed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating 
the trust, including any amendments or modifications in writing made at any time before 
or after the making of the will and before the death of the testator. Unless the will 
provides otherwise, the property so devised and bequeathed shall not be deemed held 
under a testamentary trust if the designated trustee is a corporate trustee authorized by 
law to act as an executor or administrator. An entire revocation of the trust prior to the 
testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest. 
NORTH CAROLINA 
[N.C. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §31-47] 
A devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter 
may be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust established in writing prior 
to the execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the 
trust is amendable or revocable or both by the settlor or any other person or persons; 
nor because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the 
manner required for wills; nor because the trust was amended after execution of the 
will. Unless the will provides otherwise, such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose 
of property under the terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the testator's death 
and the property shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust. An entire revoca-
tion of the trust prior to the -testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest. 
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OREGON 
[Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §114.070) 
Section I. A devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions of 
this chapter may be made in form or substance to the trustee of a trust in existence at 
the date of the testator's death and established by written instrument executed prior 
to the execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the 
trust is amendable by the settlor or any other person or persons, provided that the will 
or the last codicil thereto was executed subsequent to the time of execution of the trust 
instrument and all amendments thereto. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
(Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1957) tit. 20, §180.141] 
A devise or bequest in a will may be made to the trustee of a trust (including an 
unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of owner-
ship in the insurance contracts) established, in writing, by the testator or any other person 
before or concurrently with the execution of such will or to such a trust to be established, 
in writing, at a future date: Provided, That any such future trust instrument or amend-
ment thereto shall be signed by the settlor. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid 
because the trust was amended after execution of the will. Unless the will provides 
otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed shall not ,be deemed held under a 
testamentary trust of the testator but shall become and be a part of the principal of the 
trust to which it is given to be administered and disposed of in accordance with the 
provisions of the instrument establishing such trust and any amendment thereof. An entire 
revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest 
unless the will directs otherwise. 
WISCONSIN 
[Wis. Stat. (1957) §231.205) 
(1) Any instrument declaring or creating a trust, when othenvise valid, shall not be 
held an invalid trust, or an attempted testamentary disposition, because it contains any 
of the following powers, whether exercisable by the settlor or another or both: 
(a) To revoke, alter, amend or modify any or all provisions of the trust. 
(b) To exercise any power or option over any property transferred to or held in the 
trust. 
(c} To add to or withdraw from the trust all or any part thereof at one time or at 
different times. 
(d) To direct during the lifetime of the settlor or another, the persons and organiza-
tions to whom or on ,behalf of whom the income shall be paid or principal distributed. 
(2) A trust otherwise valid, created by a written instrument, whether or not it contains 
any or all of the powers specified in sub. (1), shall have existence independent of any 
will and be eligible to receive property bequeathed, devised or appointed by the settlor 
and others, whatever the size or character of its corpus or the terms of the instrument, 
unless the instrument specifically states otherwise. No reference to any such trust in any 
will shall cause the trust assets to be included in the property administered as part of 
the testator's estate. 
(3) Any or all of the powers listed in sub. (1) may be exercised without affecting the 
validity of the trust, its nontestamentary character and its independent existence and 
eligibility for the receipt of property bequeathed, devised and appointed to it, and the 
exercise of a power, under sub. (l)(a) to amend, alter or modify the provisions of the 
instrument shall be effective to change such provisions as to property devised, bequeathed 
or appointed by will to the trust even though the settlor's will is not re-executed or 
republished after the exercise of such power . 
• • • • • 
(6) Any amendment, alteration or modification of a trust subject to this section shall 
be effective to change the provisions thereof as to property devised, bequeathed or ap-
pointed by will to the trust even though the will is not re-executed or republished after 
the effective date of the amendment, alteration or modification, if the settlor or testator 
is alive on or after July 26, 1957. 
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WYOMING 
[Wyo. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §6-310] 
1. By a will signed and attested as provided in this Act a testator may devise and 
bequeath real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written 
instrument in existence when the will is made and which is identified in the will, even 
though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or termination. Unless 
the will provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed shall be governed by 
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including any amendments 
or modifications in writing made at any time before or after the making of the will and 
before the death of the testator. 
